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In his magisterial account of African Politics, Chris Allen concluded that Zimbabwe and
Namibia, despite having won independence through “prolonged warfare” were
“following similar paths to those of the peacefully decolonised majority”.2   Indeed, the
similarities to both West African and East African single party states became more
visible as the 1990s went on.3  Yet recent writing on post-liberation politics, drawing
particularly on the examples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, has emphasised the similarities
between these states, emphasised  the impact of the liberation war and at least implicitly
suggested their differences from other African states.4  But in comparing Southern
African states to each other only part of the story is told; adding a country like Eritrea to
the mix helps us better understand the political trajectory of Zimbabwe, and vice-versa:
. …the exceptional case, which stands out from the rest, invites us to
explain why it is different and to reconsider why specific conditions gave
rise to the features common to all the other cases.5
The Eritrean case reveals the significance of the negotiated transitions and the inherited
state institutions (or the lack thereof), in addition to the history of the armed struggle.
                                             
1 This paper draws on research conducted by the author in Zimbabwe (1995, 1996-1997, 1999, 2000 &
2003) and Eritrea (2002). This is a first draft.  Apologies for the inconsistencies in the footnote referencing,
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2   Allen, "Understanding African Politics", Review of African Political Economy, 65, 1995, 301-320.  315;
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Liberation War Legacies
Liberation struggles generate a powerful, yet potentially divisive, stock of political
actions and imagery.  In discussions of African politics, symbolism and rhetoric often
only appear in terms of excess and absurdity: Mobutu as ‘bon père de famille’6; Banda as
Messiah.7  Less often is the more pervasive ‘banal’ nationalism given due attention.8
Liberation wars, however, generate potent and meaningful symbolic politics.  Post-
liberation states rely on the  “situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for
inclusion or exclusion”.9  But in relying on narratives of conformity and unity, they
confront the divisions and rivalries generated during the conflict.  It is this contradiction
that generates the tensions and intensity of relations between states and societies in post-
liberation states.
The nationalist movements were forced to move to armed conflict when faced
with the intransigence of the settler colonists in Zimbabwe, and the expansionist
Ethiopian state in Eritrea.  These wars left legacies in the lives of civilians, especially in
rural communities, and in the experiences of those who fought in the guerrilla armies,
which are increasingly being explored by historians and anthropologists.10  But the
political legacies are less well documented and understood – although in some ways more
visible.  Are the post-liberation leaderships ‘born powerful’ or constrained by their
wartime experiences and post-war compromises?
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Bhebe, Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1995a),  ; Nhongo-
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Leadership factionalization and conflict
It has been the issue of leadership of the liberation movements, perhaps more than any
other, which has distinguished the politics of these states.  The parti s which took power
at independence were the victors of processes of factionalization and fusion.
Zimbabwe’s liberation movement split into two competing parties (and subsequently
armies) in 1963.  Despite pressure for them to re-unify during the war, ZANU and ZAPU
remained distinct parties until 1987.  During the liberation war, ZAPU, lead by veteran
nationalist Joshua Nkomo, appeared to have seniority over the younger ZANU, led first
by Ndabaningi Sithole, and then by the little-known Robert Mugabe.  This situation
reversed itself after 1980, when ZANU clinched a majority of seats in the first parliament
and went on to increase its domination of the political scene.  During the war, ZANU and
ZAPU guerrillas had made hostile contacts, and despite attempts to create a unified army,
they soon erupted into conflict after 1980.  In Eritrea, divisions similarly existed between
liberation armies, which led to a bitter civil war between the older sectarian ELF, and the
new, secular challenger, EPLF.11  Unlike in Zimbabwe, however, the EPLF succeeded in
winning a military victory over the ELF and forced them out of the field of action.  Since
independence, the EPLF has dominated the political scene through its successor PFDJ.
Both ‘successful’ parties, however, also faced internal divisions.  Zimbabwe’s
Badza/Nhari rebellion, premised on questions of elite privilege and hardships in the field,
was also a critique of the Maoist orientation of ZANU.   Both the March 11 movement,
and the Zimbabwe People’s Army were also ideologically based and seen as threats by
the parties’ leaderships.12  In Eritrea, the anti-Maoist ‘manqa’ raised issues of “increased
democratic accountability...and power-sharing” in contrast to Afewerki’s expressed
preference for ‘a guiding role for the leadership and controlled participation through
discussion”13. Although these internal crises divided the liberation fighters, they also
                                             
11  Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, . Esp. 59-104
12  Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, (Harare: Rujeko, 1995), ;White, The Assassination of
Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe, (Bloomington: University of Indiana, 2003),  Moore,
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enabled Mugabe to consolidate power over ZANU and Afewerki to do the same in the
EPLF, creating a “stronger framework of control over internal dissidence”14 which
represented “a victory of a centralist conception of democracy rather than a populist
one”15.  Although the repression of dissent in both cases involved detentions and
executions, the Zimbabwean case has been interpreted as a case of ‘passive revolution’,
while the Eritrean crisis is analysed more simply as suppression of dissent, and the
emergence of a dominant leadership group.
So, in both cases, the parties that took power at independence succeeded in
removing or diminishing alternative claimants to the ‘liberation’ mantle, and dominating
the political environment.  In both countries, conventional wisdom suggested that no
‘non-liberation’ party could ever hold power, such was the power of the nationalist
rhetoric.  In Zimbabwe, it was long forecast that effective opposition would emerge from
within ZANU(PF).  Although there have long been schisms and critical voices within
ZANU, the only significant opposition party to form around senior ZANU leaders was
Edgar Tekere’s ZUM, which contested the 1990 elections. The MDC, which has proven a
much more successful opposition since its launch in 1999, has few high-profile former
ZANU members, although most of its older generation of leadership was at one point
affiliated either with ZANU or ZAPU.
In Eritrea, a schism emerged within the leadership of the PFDJ, with very little
warning.  In 2001, 15 members of the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
(PFDJ)’s Central Committee, and the National Assembly, including several generals and
ministers, appealed privately to the President, for internal party reform, the
implementation of the 1997 constitution, and the holding of national elections.16
Following a brief period of public discussion, the dissidents, who came to be known as
the G-15, were accused of being “engaged in unlawful acts against the sovereignty and
national security of the country.”17  Those in Asmara were detained without access to
lawyers or their families in October 2001.18   Although in Zimbabwe, politicians were
arrested and accused of treason with very little evidence, their arrests were known and
                                             
14  Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 78.
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17  “PRESS RELEASE” ERITREA PROFILE 13 OCTOBER 2001 PAGE 1
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5
documented, and they were given access to lawyers and other concerned visitors.19  In
contrast, no evidence or charges have been laid against those detained in 2001, although
the state has insisted that this will take place in due time.20  Reported defections by
foreign service personnel, journalists, and the former head of the demobilization
programme further reveal splits in the regime.21
Security and sovereignty…Discourses of sacrifice and suffering
While both Zimbabwe and Eritrea have been the recipients of Korean built monuments to
their liberation wars (North Korea in the case of Zimbabwe, South Korea in Eritrea),
Eritreans take memorialization more seriously.  At national holidays, shop windows are
decked out with patriotic slogans and posters and buildings are festooned with ‘Christmas
tree lights’.  Postcards, stamps and tourism posters celebrate not just the ethnic diversity
and architecture, but also victories of the wars.  Zimbabwe’s liberation war iconography
has been mainly limited to official monuments, which in Norma Kriger’s words
“exposed the gap between the political rhetoric of equity, participation, and unity on the
one hand, and the realities of an enormous disparity between...leaders and masses.”22
Indeed, the party-political nature of the liberation war discourse, reifying ZANU and
ignoring ZAPU, led Werbner to label it ‘quasi-national.23’  While Zimbabwe made great
use out of nationalist rhetoric and ation-building, it securely buffered these exhortations
with actual material benefits in the form of investment in health and education, especially
in rural areas, which dramatically improved the quality of life for many Zimbabweans.
The material benefits of independence seem less marked in the poorer Erit an state,
                                             
19  See for example, “Muzorewa arrested” Herald 2 November 1983, 1; “Why Muzorewa being detained -
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Eritrean diplomat requests political asylum in Sweden”  awate.com 29 December 2003.
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Who is a hero – ZAPU?” Herald 16 September 1982, 7; “Who is a hero”  Zimbabwe Mirror 23 July 1999.
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where ideologies of sacrifice, also prevalent in Zimbabwe24, take on a more commandist
tone.  During the candle-light services on the eve of Martyrs Day 2002, the power was
turned out across the country and the sale of alcohol banned for 24 hours. This was said
to facilitate appropriate behaviour on the part of mourners.
Regional politics in the years after independence contributed to the continued
saliency of liberation war rhetoric and a discourse in which democracy had to take a back
foot to security.  Both countries found themselves at odds with powerful neighbours in
the years after independence.  In the 1980s, South Africa actively tried to destabilize both
Zimbabwe and its other neighbours.  These efforts included attempts to infiltrate and
influence ‘dissident’ movements in Matabeleland (the so-called Super-Zapu group),
recruitment of ex-Rhodesian spies, and covert attacks on ANC targets.25  Zimbabwe also
committed troops to support counter-insurgency efforts in Mozambique, where South
Africa financed RENAMO during that country’s long civil war.  At the time, these events
were thought significant because they enabled ZANU to maintain Rhodesian era laws and
strategies.26 Important accounts of this period have emphasised the psycho-social impact
of the ZNA’s brutal onslaught on the people of Matabeleland, accused of harbouring
traitorous dissidents.27  But the rhetorical impact of this period has often been under-
estimated.  While those in Matabeleland experienced the harshness of army counter-
insurgency techniques, culled from their North Korean trainers, the rest of Zimbabwe was
subject to a non-ending public discourse about the need for unity in the face of external
aggression.
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Unity, however, was also seen as essential for ‘development’ and intra-societal
unity was demanded of groups like teachers, farmers, and workers to that end.28 Crystal is
surely correct to emphasize the ways in which an ideology of developmentalism foster
the belief that “the state must play the central role in promoting economic growth and
that, to that end, individuals and social organisations must relinquish power to it,
allowing it the routine, if temporary use of force against enemies.”29  Eritrea’s rhetoric,
perhaps unsurprisingly given the longer and les promising conditions of their struggle,
stays much closer to the security discourse. Development is present, but even more
clearly linked to sovereignty.  In 1997, for example, Isaias said:
The national feeling which until yesterday centralized around the
imperative of bring about the liberation of homeland is today focusing on
protecting and defending it as well as strengthening its structural pillars
and making shorter the journey of national development.30
The devastating war with Ethiopia, which began in 1998, fed a new intensification of
discourse, as ex-fighters were called up, and the young were newly mobilized.  Those
inside and outside the country who did not fight contributed financially to the war effort.
Although a peace agreement was signed in 2000, the continuing tensions with Ethiopia,
mean that this rhetoric has only diminished slightly, and broadened to include new
targets.31  In September 2001 just before the detention of the G-15, Eritreans were
reminded that it was “incumbent on all citizens to unite their ranks and intensify the
struggle to build the new Eritrea without being influenced by divisive elements.”32   Just
                                             
28   “Create Unity, Mutumbuka urges 5000 head-masters” Herald 13 November 1981, 3;  “Nhongo urges
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under twenty years earlier Mugabe warned Zimbabweans: “If you show divisionist
attitudes the enemy will come among us and will destroy us.”33
While the threats to sovereignty were real, especially in the Eritrean case, they
also served a political purpose, in extending and perpetuating a militarised and securitised
discourse, which discouraged criticism and alternative views.  As has been written about
Cuba’s authoritarian state: “...to oppose Fidel meant to oppose national sovereignty,
which is the revolution’s central legacy.’”34
Mobilization – Demobilization – Remobilization
Liberation is assumed to be predicated the success of a mobilized society. It is difficult,
however, to assess to what extent and how evenly peasants, urban dwellers, and others
were mobilized during the struggle, and what impact that mobilization has on post-
liberation relations with the party-turned-state.   Nevertheless, we can identify patterns in
Zimbabwe consistent with demobilization, and in Eritrea, with continued mobilization.
Demobilization
After independence, ZANU’s party membership structures were allowed to atrophy.35
Despite regular claims throughout the 1980s and 1990s that national service would be
introduced for youth, it was not attempted until 2001.36  The women’s and youth leagues
of the party were often violent campaigners in elections, but were not significant
organizations at other times.  Although ex-fighters were sometimes called upon to play
significant political roles in the early years, they soon felt themselves to have been
sidelined.  Norma Kriger writes that although ex-fighters were ‘born powerful’ they were
none-the-less aggrieved by the “lack of material and symbolic recognition of the ex-
                                             
33  “Division will destroy us, says Mugabe” Herald 18 October 1982.
34   Hawkins, "Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights from Cuba", Comparative Politics, 33,
2001, 441-461. 448.
35 Alexander, "The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe: Case Studies of Insiza and
Chimanimani Districts, 1940-1990", Unpublished D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1993. See also -123.
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combatants' war services” and that they “resented the distance their former leaders kept
from them.”37   The ex-fighters were only grudgingly allowed to form their own
representative organization in 1990.
NGOs, Churches, workers, students and professionals were all expected to work
in and through the ZANU(PF) dominated state structures. Yet, this strategy was also
relatively pluralist, with relatively few legal constraints on organizations, although this
changed over the years. For example, Zimbabwean NGOs operated under Rhodesian era
legislation until 1995, with little oversight from the Ministry responsible for them.  In
1995, the introduction of NGO legislation was the final step in a series of laws introduced
to regulate and control the University students and academics and trades unions.38  Out of
thousands of NGOs, only two have been threatened with closure by the Ministry; both
appear to have been cases where the regime coveted the resources.39  Nevertheless, in the
early 1980s, and in the late 1990s, NGOs were increasingly under surveillance, and
warned to watch their behaviour in official ministerial speeches.
Zimbabwe’s strong economy and relative regional stability clearly enabled the
state to provide goods and services which entrenched the belief that the regime was
bringing ‘development’.  It also took advantage of offered donor funds, and tolerated, if
not encouraged, the formation of local NGOs.  While international NGOs existed, the
salient and numerically dominant sector was Zimbabwean.  Whether the source was
donor funds or other, the regime was also able to take credit for most development
projects.
                                             
37   Kriger, "The War Victims Compensation Act", Journal of African Conflict and Development, 1, 2000,
ms p2.  see also Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-
1987, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 175.
38 Tengende,  “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 437-8; Nordlund, Organising the
Political Agora, 184; Ngoni Chanakira, “Academic Freedom in Higher Institutions of Learning in
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39  On the AWC case see: Dorman, "Inclusion and Exclusion: Ngos and Politics in Zimbabwe", DPhil.,
University of Oxford, 2001. On the Savings Development Movement see Michael Bratton, “Non-




In contrast, the Eritrean state encouraged the formation of the Eritr an war disabled
fighters association,40 although not  an association of ex-combatants in the aggregate.
Fighters do seem to have maintained some political influence.  In his study of the EPLF,
David Pool speaks of a ‘socio-economic protest’ resulting from the non-payment of
salaries in the months after the r ferendum, that also raised issues about democratic
accountability within the new state.41  In a public statement sometime after the revolt,
President Isaias spoke only of ex-fighters who  “believed they were being abandoned by
government…[and] took one of the officers hostage…demanded to speak to the
president’ 42  Despite this incident, or perhaps as a result of it, ex-fighters remain a
relatively privileged and respected group.  They have concessionary rights to import cars
duty-free, most seem to have been provided with employment, and some are being
sponsored for higher education.  Questions have been raised about the experiences of
female ex-combatants,43 which have been recognized to some extent by the state.44
More generally, in Eritrea, continued mobilization of both the military and
civilian variety has dominated society’s experience of liberation.  The apogee of this has
been the emphasis on ‘national service’.  Seen as a continuation of the selfless giving
during the liberation war, many returnees in the years between 1991- 1994 worked
voluntarily to re-establish the state.  Official national service was implemented in 1994,
and written into the 1997 constitution.45  Since the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia,
however, national service has become a permanent situation.46  65 000 fighters, mainly
veterans of the independence war, were demobilized in 2003/4, but the ‘warsay’ or
                                             
40 ‘EWDFA holds 2nd congress’ Eritrea Profile 27 APRIL 1996 VOL 3 NO 7 PAGE 1; ‘Eritrean war
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41   Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 173-175.
42   “The president replies” Eritrea Profile 17 SEPTEMBER 1994, VOL 1 NUMBER 27 pp 4-5
43   Matsuoka and Sorenson, After Independence: Prospects for Women in Eritrea, Unpublished, ;Bernal,
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collectors” Shaebia.com 7 May 2004.
45   "National Service - the Facts", Eritrea Profile, 1, 12, 1994, 4;"Benefits of National Service Stressed",
Eritrea Profile, 1, 10, 1994, 1;The Constitution of Eritrea, 1997, 1997.
46   "“Nation Launches Warsay-Yikealo Campaign”," Eritrea Profile, 11 May 2002, 1.
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national service youth, continue to serve.47  The following explanation of the national
development campaign which mobilised 60 000 Eritreans immediately prior to the 1998
war, conveys well the rationale:
During the armed struggle for liberation it was part of our policy to launch
campaigns that involved popular participation. It was such popular
initiatives that enabled us finally to repulse large and well-armed attacks.
It is not wise to leave everything to the government.  Any development
strategy should get full-participation from the people who are directly
benefiting from it. If we are going to build an economically strong
country, free of ignorance and disease and self-reliant, then we have to
take it as our duty to participate in its development.48
This mobilization also extends into other areas, students entering the university
have little choice about which department they are allocated to, and after graduation are
allocated to various ministries to work as part of their ‘national service’.  Those
employed in national service are paid a ‘stipend’ or what the university payroll staff call
‘pocket money’.  A select group of graduates from each university are sent abroad for
further study. 49  Many have not returned, knowing that they face a predictable future of
low pay in their continued years of service.  Attempts to prevent young people
absconding have led to army ‘checkpoints’ on all roads, and annual ‘round-ups’ which
involve the dispersal of thousands of military police into the streets, checking the IDs of
all passers-by, and even, it is reported, seizing young people from houses at the crack of
dawn.50  The atmosphere in these periods is particularly bad, with many of the young
staying at home in relative safety.  Businesses that had turned to young female staff with
the conscription of young men, now find themselves more and more desperate for labour.
Eritreans insist that they did not resist conscription before 1998, but that the abuse of
women by senior officers was so pervasive that parents are increasingly unwilling to let
their daughters serve.  High rates of pregnancy and HIV-AIDS among conscripts, many
                                             
47   “all female NS participants demobilized” Eritrea Profile, 28 December 2003, 1; Ministry of
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of whom have either been raped, or chose to become pregnant as a way of evading
service, are alleged to have distressed many families.  Exit-visas for travel abroad are also
tightly controlled, in order to prevent further brain and brawn drain.
Eritrea has resisted any tendencies towards pluralism.  International NGOs have
been tightly regulated.  After the first post-war NGO was closed down and restrictive
new laws were brought in, in the mid-1990s many international NGOs left in disgust, or,
by some accounts, were asked to leave.51   Four NGOs working on mine clearance were
‘asked to terminate operations’ in August 2002.52  Local NGOs are few and far between.
Three ‘social movements’ representing the youth, women and workers are the most
visible and significant players, although they are not entirely distinct from either the party
or the state.53  In so far as they function to “obstruct the independent organization of
social interests”, they resemble Kasza’s administered mass organizations.54   The national
youth organization precludes the existence of student groups, scout troops, and or sports
groups.55  In 1996, an organization set up to represent and provide services for female ex-
fighters was closed down on orders from the President’s office because “it duplicated the
work of other organizations.”56
The EPLF’s sensitivity to religious divisions has had a particular impact on
churches, although the 1998 Constitution enshrines complete religious freedoms.  The
two of four main religious leaders – the Islamic mufti and the Orthodox Patriarch – are
thought to be appointed by the head of state.  The other two main churches, the Lutheran
church and the Roman Catholics, also have close ties to the state.  Jehovah’s witnesses,
whose refusal to vote or serve in the military infuriated the ruling party, have not been
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tolerated.57  In 1995 it was declared that churches could not carry out development
work.58   A limited number of ‘evangelical’ churches were permitted to operate until
May 2002, when they were told to close. In Zimbabwe, churches have been better
tolerated, especially when they have engaged in ‘development projects’.59  In the early
1980s, independent churches were criticised for their anti-modern stance, and rejection
of bio-medicine.  However, by the time of the 2000 parliamentary election, they were
being hastily recruited as ‘authentic’ supporters of ZANU, and registered en-masse to
vote.60
Media and freedom of expression
Zimbabwe’s freedom of the press has been characterised by self-censorship, and more
recently politically-inspired attacks on the press and journalists. The burgeoning of
independent newspapers in the late 1990s, at the same time as cell phones, satellite TV
and email became wide-spread among the elite further reduced any possibility that the
regime might successfully control the media.  On the whole, it did not try to do so until
the late 1990s, when journalists were detained and tortured61  the only independent daily
newspaper was closed 62, radio licenses restricted63 and unsuccessful attempts made to
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control internet access.64  In contrast, Eritrea was the last African country to gain internet
access65 and cell-phone networks have just begun to operate.66  Independent newspapers,
which had been allowed to publish after 1997, were shut down in 2001.67
The parties and economic development
As a new country, Eritrea began independence without any foreign debt, but with few
other economic advantages.  While Zimbabwe inherited a strong export sector and
domestic production (and unlike Mozambique experienced little vandalism) Eritrea had
none of these benefits.  Although in the 1980s, Zimbabwe limited imports, it did have a
significant ability to supply a limited range of clothing, blankets, food, wine and beer,
kitchen implements, books, paper and so forth for domestic consumers.  In Eritrea, the
domestic manufacturing base is weak, despite some remaining Italian-era factories, and
few inputs are produced locally.  As a result, markets and shops are dominated by cheap
imports from Asia and the Gulf.  Perhaps because of this weak domestic base, and despite
its officially free-market policies, Eritrea’s ruling party has increasingly monopolized the
economy through PFDJ-run enterprises known as ’party-partals.’  These enterprises
dominate the limited ‘private’ market, along with organizations run by ex-fighters and the
former EPLF mass organizations, which have also been pressurised into the market
economy.68  The PFDJ-linked corporations have also benefited from access to cheap
labour in the form of conscript workers.  While ZANU(PF) did create a ‘business empire’
in Zimbabwe, with links into multi-national deals69, it has never been a dominant
economic force.  The white-owned and multi-national corporations were wooed by
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ZANU(PF), as important partners in the post-independence state.  Attempts by
indigenization lobbies to influence political decision-making were limited until the late
1990s.70
Remobilization
Zimbabwe’s recent destabilization is the result of efforts on the part of ZANU(PF) to
remobilise society, directly linked to its electoral fortunes in 2000.  However, the
remobilisation of Zimbabwean society actually started outside the party, with the war
veterans protests in 1997.
The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) had
been  formed in 1990, in response to the existence of impoverished war veterans “whose
plight was not only an embarrassment to the government, but who had also
become...potential recruits to ZUM.”71   Indeed, while this group was affiliated to the
ruling party, and led by party loyalists, it had the potential to radically critique the
government’s post-colonial achievements.  In 1996, when Margaret Dongo revealed in
Parliament that he War Victims Compensation Fund had been looted by senior party and
government officials, the Chidyausiku Commission was set up and mandated to
investigate.  The commission suspended payments to veterans, leading to a series of riots
and protests in June-August 1997.
Unlike other protesters they were not regular tear-gassed, dispersed or charged.
With apparent impunity, they occupied and looted the ZANU(PF) party headquarters,
took over a courtroom—chasing out judges and court officials, disrupted Heroes’ Day
celebrations across the country and demanded and received meetings with senior party
officials and President Mugabe.72  Ministers holding meetings in Harare were forced to
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flee, in Bulawayo, veterans threatened to beat up Home Affairs Minister Dumiso
Dabengwa, and in Lupane John Nkomo, Minster of Local Government Rural and Urban
Development was also forced to flee the fury of ex-fighters, while elsewhere ministers
were faced with verbal abuse and shouted down.73
The government rapidly conceded to their demands.74   However, the unbudgeted
agreement to provide these ‘pay-outs’ had an immediate impact on the Zimbabwean
economy, with the November 1997 currency crash from which the Zimbabwe dollar has
never recovered. Two further repercussions are important:  The economic decline of the
1990s meant that there were few resources available to the state which it could distribute
to the war veterans.  Realization of the limitation led the state to turn to land
redistribution, in an attempt to placate this suddenly volatile constituency, endowed with
immense symbolic capital.  From 1998 onwards, rhetoric over land grew, leading to the
inclusion of a clause in the draft constitution empowering the state to seize land without
redress.  In the aftermath of the February 2000 referendum the war veterans, aided by
party loyalists and unemployed youths, moved onto commercial farms and began to
claim land.  This process was later formalized as the ‘fast track’ land distribution process.
Over the same period, the white community which had hitherto maintained a safe
distance from overt political involvement, began to be participate in initiatives like the
NCA, public meetings, and the MDC.75  This process was not uniform or unambiguous:
the government’s rhetoric claiming that whites were behind the NCA and MDC was
grossly over-exaggerated.  The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which had been close
to ZANU(PF) until the 1998 land designations, wavered between attempting to maintain
its position of non-confrontational interaction with government ministries and using the
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courts to seek redress, reflecting the presence of two camps within its membership.  MDC
members pressured the CFU to pursue legal action against the unconstitutional land
seizures.  Other groups of farmers, notably tobacco growers, producing mainly for export,
have emphasized the economic realities, and urged the farm community to seek ways of
compromising with the ruling party.76  However, the combination of increased white
involvement in politics, along with and through churches, NGOs, and unions generated a
much more mobilized and participatory sector, increasingly defining itself outside of
ZANU(PF)’s orbit.77   ZANU(PF) has matched this process, initially by attempting to
organize its own NGO sector, along with its own Constitutional Commission.78
Alongside efforts to re-invigorate ZANU(PF) structures, it has began a controversial
youth national service programme79  and wooed traditional chiefs.80  Substantial efforts
have been made to avoid allegations that land reform is only for elites, doubtless as part
of programme to rebuild a rural constituency.81   In 2004, Zimbabwe remains polarized,
but also mobilized.
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Continuity and Change
Much has been written about the continuity of institutions and ideologies from Rhodesia
to Zimbabwe, which is attributed to the negotiated transition.82  Eritrea inherited
relatively little institutionally from Ethiopia, and has been at great pains to emphasize the
discontinuities of territorial and governmental re-organization.83  Despite this, similarities
to older ways of thinking and organising are occasionally suggested. Clapham for
instance argues that ‘Eritrean nationalism…appears to reproduce, within the colonial
boundaries of Eritrea, a concept of boundary and territory almost indistinguishable from
that of both imperial and revolutionary governments in the years before 1991 in Ethiopia
as a whole.’84   However, by taking control militarily, the leaders of the Eritrean state
were not required to, nor interested in, negotiating with settled interests.  In many cases,
ministries appear to have been taken over and staffed with battalions of ex-fighters.  As
was suggested above, the paucity of large corporations enabled the EPLF to simply
repatriate their diaspora trading connections.
In contrast, the negotiated transition in Zimbabwe created constraints, not simply
of the institutional form found in the constitution, but generated a different kind of
politics.  Neighbouring politicians, and his own real-po itik, encouraged Mugabe to seek
alliances with the former white politicians, opposition blacks, and multi-nationals,
incorporating them into his sphere of influence.  Stanley Trapido argues that this sort of
expanding and contracting web of coalition building is typical of all nationalist
movements.85 And, as Linz argues, competing societal interests can only be balanced in a
demobilized society:
Effective mobilisation, particularly through a single party and its mass
organisations, would be perceived as a threat by the other components of
the limited pluralism, typically, the army, the bureaucracy, the churches or
interest groups.86
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Eritrea, in contrast, with its independence seized at the barrel of the gun, had far
fewer forces to balance, and less need to listen to advice.  Eritrea’s lack of a commitment
to ‘limited pluralism’ has enabled the government been to maintain a mobilized society,
in which groups with potentially distinct interests have co-operated, until the demands of
mobilization exceeded their commitment.  At first only tiny fractions of the population –
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Islamic political movements – resisted the party/state’s agenda.
But as larger numbers of people have experienced the coercive side of the state –
national service dodgers and their families, elderly mediators and students – discontent
has grown.  As a former government insider recently said: “The political condition in
Eritrea has continued to deteriorate to the point that no Eritrean, including so-called high-
ranking officials, can be considered immune from arbitrary arrests.”87
Post-liberation politics in southern Africa has tended to emphasize inclusionary
tactics – although some groups are ‘outside’, efforts are made to include as many ‘inside’
as possible.  Increasingly exclusionary politics result from the unbalancing of the
demobilized, stable post-liberation bargain. The mobilization and privileging of certain
members of the coalition weakens the regime’s hold over other, former allies. It also
opens spaces for alternative accounts of nationalism or other ideologies to flourish. In
doing so, it further reflects a diminishing in the ideological or cultural elements of power,
as well as the material. This leaves coercive force on its own, in a much weaker position
than when justified by rhetoric or resource distribution.  There are simply few incentives
(carrots) for people to support the regimes, instead there are coercive mechanisms (sticks)
designed to enforce their acquiescence.  As Fred Halliday memorably said about a rather
different regime, its weakness was ‘reliance on orders and moral exhortation alone’.88
Both Eritrea and Zimbabwe have been plunged into crisis as they increasingly rely on
coercive and exclusionary politics.
Authoritarian politics in Africa is frequently interpreted as either ‘politics of the
belly’ (that is material need or greed) or ‘coercion’.  Neither Zimbabwe nor Eritrea fit
either characterization terribly well, yet both are markedly authoritarian.  Though both
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greed and coercion exist in Zimbabwe and in Eritrea to differing extents, these
explanations do not engender understanding of their particular state-society relations, and
the changes that have occurred within them.  The paper has argued instead that
authoritarianism in these two cases must be understood as based on a combination of
inclusionary tactics – both material and symbolic – buttressed by selective coercion,
which generated authoritarian regimes, with a certain amount of stability and durability,
despite markedly different approaches to societal mobilization and demobilization.  In
both cases, however, attempts to maintain mobilized populations under conditions of
economic scarcity have destabilized state-society relations.
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